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Enemy Aliens and Internment
By Matthew Stibbe
The internment of enemy aliens in the First World War was a global phenomenon. Camps
holding civilian as well as military prisoners could be found on every continent, including in
nation-states and empires that had relatively liberal immigration policies before the war.
This article focuses on three of the best-known examples: Britain, Germany and the United
States. Each had its own internment system and its own internal threshold of tolerance for
violence. Nonetheless, they were interconnected through wartime propaganda and
diplomacy, and through constant appeals to the rules of war, the rights of "civilised"
nations and the requirements of self-defence.
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In addition to 9 million military prisoners of war (POWs), the warring European states interned
more than 400,000 enemy aliens – civilians of enemy nationality – between 1914 and 1920.[1]
Other "suspect" groups and individuals were held captive by their own governments on grounds of
national security, reflecting increasingly sophisticated, albeit still relatively crude forms of domestic
political surveillance.[2] Even non-belligerent countries like the Netherlands interned would-be
deserters, civilian refugees, escaped POWs and other unwanted "war guests" who had
deliberately or accidently crossed their borders and thereby "violated" their neutrality.[3] Taking
enemy aliens and other outsiders together, as many as 800,000 civilians in Europe experienced
some form of internment during the Great War and its aftermath. The same applies to a further
50,000 to 100,000 non-combatants in the rest of the world.[4] In terms of scale and global reach,
this was of an altogether different order than the one-sided use of internment by European colonial
powers in conflicts in Cuba and South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century.[5]
Until the 1990s, much of the historiography assumed, somewhat misleadingly, that during the First
World War (WWI) civilian captivity was confined to men of military age caught on enemy territory
at the outbreak of hostilities and held as potential combatants. Only in the last two decades has
attention shifted to other, forgotten victims of internment, including enemy civilians deported from
occupied territories,[6] minority ethnic groups targeted as "disloyal",[7] and refugees forced to live in
enclosed barrack camps in the unoccupied parts of their own countries.[8] Although men made up
the bulk of internees, it is now recognised that women and children were also affected either
indirectly, through separation from their husband or other breadwinner, or directly, by being
interned themselves. In general, internment was a gendered and gendering experience,
emasculating men and disempowering women.[9]
Conditions in WWI Internment Camps|internment camps varied widely.[10] At the local level, much
depended on the attitude of individual camp commandants and their staff. Governments
sometimes offered better treatment or even exemption from internment to particular nationalities or
ethnic groups, albeit usually for political-strategic rather than humanitarian reasons. More
important still was the attitude and position of the captives’ own government. Defeated and
occupied countries, such as Serbia or Romania, could do little to help their citizens in enemy
captivity.[11] Other belligerents, most notably Italy, deliberately decided not to "waste" resources on
doing so. As early as August 1915, for instance, the American embassy in Vienna, acting as
protecting power, was forced to inform an inmate at the camp at Kirchberg an der Wild in Lower
Austria that the Italian authorities had "not given the necessary authorisation for the granting of
financial assistance to Italian citizens interned in the Monarchy";[12] and later in the war the
Austrian military censors picked up on complaints from Italian civilian prisoners about their
government’s wilful negligence and tendency to regard all deportees and hostages seized in
enemy-occupied territories as "deserters."[13]
Most western states, on the other hand, as well as the multinational Habsburg and Romanov
Empires, were anxious to project an image of active involvement in reducing hardships for
subjects interned abroad, not least in order to mollify public opinion at home and avoid protests
from prisoners’ families. Pressure from the Vatican, neutral states such as Switzerland, Spain and
the United States, and humanitarian bodies like the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) also acted to some extent as a check on serious abuses of civilian prisoners.[14] However,
informal mechanisms of reciprocity played a more important role. In other words, governments
could be deterred from harming enemy civilians by fear of repercussions for their own citizens in
enemy hands. In this sense, stateless persons or those held captive by their own governments
were the least protected and did not even appear on ICRC lists.[15]
Recent trends towards the writing of transnational and comparative histories of modern warfare
have also aided our understanding of what Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker called
the "camp phenomenon".[16] In particular, the internment of enemy aliens and prisoners of war is
now linked to broader questions about WWI "culture", including mass violence towards soldiers,
POWs and civilians,[17] the destruction of cultural treasures,[18] the (mis)treatment of minorities in
wartime,[19] the use of forced labour and other human rights abuses,[20] the centralisation and
nationalisation of prisoner and refugee relief systems,[21] and finally the development of new
definitions of citizenship designed to either exclude or include particular groups of people.[22] As
Alan Kramer has put it, all of these developments were transnational in the sense that they were
not simply a reflection of what went on within warring nations and empires, but rather "arose
through interaction between" them.[23] Not only did the two rival blocs, the Allies and the Central
Powers, construct parallel systems for placing civilians behind barbed wire, but they also
consciously interwove these systems by projecting themselves as victims acting in legitimate self-
defence and the other side as the original aggressors and wrongdoers. The following article will
explore the new historiography with particular reference to internment practices in Britain,
Germany and the United States.
Internment in Imperial Britain
The internment of over 32,000 German and Austro-Hungarian civilians in Britain between 1914
and 1919 took place against the background of a rising tide of xenophobia and panic over
"imagined" spies in the run-up to the outbreak of war.[24] Although Tammy Proctor is right to say
that internment was a policy enacted by the state,[25] in the British case in particular public opinion
appears to have played an important role in pressuring the government to act. The main waves of
internment, in October 1914 and May 1915, coincided with outbreaks of anti-foreigner violence in
many British towns and cities, during which German-owned property was destroyed or looted. In
some cases Germans and Austrians were arrested for their own personal safety, although the
official line was that the measures had been undertaken to safeguard the nation against internal
spies and to appease the "strong feeling against Germans roused by the atrocities...in
Belgium."[26]
From November 1914 to the beginning of February 1915, on the other hand, many internees were
quietly set free as public tensions eased. Only after the outbreak of the "Lusitania riots" in May
1915 did the government resume its move towards wholesale internment of male enemy aliens
aged seventeen to fifty-five, with the total number of men in captivity rising from 12,871 on 13 May
1915 to 32,440 by 22 November 1915.[27] This was accompanied by attempts to deny captured
German submariners the rights afforded to POWs under international law, a move which was
again justified with reference to German "war crimes" against Allied merchant shipping. However,
the latter policy was soon abandoned after German countermeasures against British military
prisoners convinced public opinion that such reprisals only harmed Britain’s interests and standing
abroad.[28]
Concern for national image also influenced how enemy aliens were treated after their arrest. In
spite of the anti-German violence of 1914 and 1915, the conditions inside the camps were
relatively good, as ICRC reports repeatedly confirmed.[29] In partiycular, Britain respected class
distinctions, allowing privileged "gentlemen’s camps" to be set up for wealthier inmates both at
Douglas on the Isle of Man, where a large number of internees were sent, and Lofthouse Park
near Wakefield, described by one inmate as a "true Beamtenstaat" [bureaucratic state] where
"nearly everyone seemed to have a sort of 'official position' he was proud of."[30] At no point during
the war were women and children interned, and civilian prisoners were entirely exempt from forced
labour. This did not mean that life behind barbed wire was comfortable, but it did suggest that
Britain was determined to protect its reputation as a "civilised" nation and to obey its obligations
under international law.[31]
Given the interlinked nature of internment systems, this latter point was important, for it made it
difficult for the German and Austro-Hungarian governments to justify any form of retaliation against
the British civilians they held. When it came to negotiations for the release of civilian prisoners,
Britain was in a strong position to dictate terms, for by March 1917, together with its colonies and
dominions, it held ten times as many Germans (36,000 to 3,500) and over fifty times as many
Austro-Hungarians (11,000 to at most 200) as the Germans and Austro-Hungarians held British
citizens.[32] Suggestions of an "all for all" exchange, including an open offer along those lines
made by the head of the German Foreign Office’s legal department, Johannes Kriege (1859-1937),
in the Reichstag on 2 November 1916, were repeatedly blocked; instead Britain offered a "head for
head" arrangement which was rejected by Germany and Austria-Hungary. As a result, the only
civilian prisoners exchanged between Britain and the Central Powers during the course of the war
were those judged permanently incapacitated for military service (under agreements reached in
1915); a handful of prisoners from "prominent families" in 1916 (which caused some controversy in
Whitehall circles resulting in a ban on further "arrangements" of this nature); and a small group of
internees aged forty-five and over (under a deal signed with Germany in January 1917 and
confirmed in July of that year, but not actually implemented until the first half of 1918).[33]
No exchange agreements were reached with Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire on the grounds
that repatriations were impossible to arrange via land or sea while the war continued.[34] On the
other hand, the number of Bulgarians and Turks held in civilian captivity in Britain was miniscule: a
mere twenty-two and sixty-four respectively were incarcerated at Knockaloe Camp on the Isle of
Man in November 1917, compared to 15,773 Germans and 2,450 Austrians.[35] In part, these low
numbers reflect an earlier government decision to allow all Bulgarians free passage out of Britain
following the onset of hostilities in October 1915, and to intern only the destitute and "suspect"
among those who chose to remain.[36] German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish men of military age
were not allowed to leave Britain’s shores voluntarily, but some were granted exemptions from
internment, especially if they were considered to be opponents of the Central Powers. Such was
the case, for instance, with anti-German Alsatians and anti-Habsburg Czechs and Poles, as well
as "Armenians who have fled here from Turkish oppression."[37]
Nonetheless, the relatively good conditions in British camps should not obscure some of the less
benign sides of the British government’s treatment of enemy aliens. Although women, children and
men over fifty-five were not interned, some were forcibly repatriated and others had to submit to a
series of humiliating controls on their day-to-day activities under the Aliens Restriction Act of 5
August 1914 and subsequent Orders in Council. For instance, they were required to register their
names with the police, obey local curfews, refrain from entering "prohibited areas", which by
November 1914 included the entire east and greater part of the south coast, and were not allowed
to own cars, motorcycles, cameras, military maps or homing pigeons. German clubs and
newspapers were shut down, and a further piece of parliamentary legislation, the British Nationality
and Status of Aliens Act of August 1918, gave the Home Secretary sweeping new powers to
repeal the naturalisation certificates of former alien subjects.[38]
Following London’s lead, many of these measures were also adopted in British colonies and
dominions, with similar consequences for German communities there. In Australia, for instance,
Gerhard Fischer has argued that the internment of around 6,890 Germans and Austro-Hungarians,
4,500 of them Australian residents and the rest deportees from South-East Asia and elsewhere,
reflected both fears about the empire’s internal and external security and the desire to
"strengthen...the British identity of the country." In the process, the "White Australia" policy was
reimagined to exclude not only Asians and coloureds but all non-members of the "British race",
including up to 700 naturalised German-Australians.[39] In British, French and Belgian colonies in
Africa, German communities were deported and/or interned, in clear breach of undertakings from
the Congress of Berlin in 1885 to keep this part of the world neutral in the event of conflict in
Europe. The same applied to German colonies overrun by Allied troops. Germans trapped in
British East Africa at the outbreak of war were sent to camps in India, while German missionaries
in British-occupied Palestine were expelled to Helwan in Egypt in late 1917 for reasons of "military
security."[40] After over four years of fighting, some 300 Germans were being held in Egypt, 2,300
in South Africa, 1,200 in India, 194 in Barbados, Bermuda and Trinidad, 2,100 in Canada, 236 in
New Zealand, eleven in Gibraltar and 1,323 in Malta.[41] The German government also accused
Britain and France of deliberately encouraging the internment and/or expulsion of Germans from
Allied countries such as Portugal and its Atlantic and African possessions (in 1916), Brazil and
Greece (in 1917) and Siam (in 1918).[42]
In Britain itself public opinion began to impact policy towards enemy aliens again in 1917/18. On
the one hand, families of British men held in Germany organised a "Ruhleben Prisoners' Release
Committee" to pressure the government into accepting the German offer of an "all for all"
exchange. They were supported by Sir Timothy Eden (1893-1963), one of the "prominent"
prisoners exchanged in 1916 and older brother of the future Prime Minister Anthony Eden (1897-
1977); by a number of Conservative and Liberal backbench peers; and by the right-wing, anti-
foreigner Daily Mail, which ran a campaign for the immediate deportation of all Germans, including
internees, under the slogan "send them all home."[43] The cabinet rejected these demands in
March 1917, but the government did draw up plans to expel as many Germans as possible after
the war. The subsequent round of deportations meant that the overall German population in Britain
was reduced from 57,500 in 1914 to 22,254 in 1919.[44] Some individual exemptions from
expulsion were granted, especially to British women who had acquired German or Austrian
nationality through marriage but were otherwise "loyal" to the King and Empire. Nonetheless, the
overall result was the eradication of a once vibrant German community in Britain, concentrated in
London, Bradford, Leeds, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow.[45]
In Australia, too, up to 6,150 Germans were expelled in 1919, a move which was justified with
explicit reference to similar measures enacted in Britain. Among them were both German-born
Australians and Germans who had been transported to Australia during the course of the war from
Singapore, Hong Kong, Ceylon, Fiji and erstwhile German colonial possessions in the Pacific.[46]
In Africa, the ex-German colonies were taken over by the victorious Allies under the League of
Nations mandate system and, except in South African-controlled South-West Africa, former and
prospective German settlers were often refused residency permits.[47] In metropolitan Britain, the
denial of self-determination to colonial peoples and the expulsion of Germans went hand in hand
with the extension of suffrage to previously excluded white (but non-German) groups, including
women over thirty years of age and returning soldiers from lower-class backgrounds. Here and in
the self-governing white-settler dominions, the move towards democratisation and expanded
notions of citizenship was interwoven with the emergence of new, more vicious forms of anti-
alienism and colonial racism.[48] The wave of anti-coloured/anti-immigrant "seaport riots" that took
place in January-August 1919 in Liverpool, Cardiff, Glasgow, London and elsewhere was one
manifestation of this.[49] Another was the tendency to redefine hierarchies of national or imperial
belonging in a way that placed "white Britishers first, next black Britishers, [and] last of all
aliens."[50]
Whereas British imperial policy was proactive, the German approach towards enemy aliens, at
least in the initial stages of the war, was largely reactive. It was also more obviously directed by
the state, which was anxious to assert its power in the international arena. The desire to appease
domestic public opinion and to safeguard the home front against spies and saboteurs also played
a role, but not a very important one. The main motive behind the internment of British enemy aliens
in November 1914, French citizens in December 1914, Canadians, South Africans and New
Zealanders in January 1915, and Australians in February 1915, was retaliation for the internment
of German nationals in those countries. At the same time, in the wake of early military setbacks in
the war and the Allies’ economic blockade of the German coastline, the Reich was anxious to show
that it could still hit back at the enemy, especially Britain.[51]
In fact, when war broke out in early August 1914, Germany had at most 15,000 British and French
residents.[52] In the first few weeks of the conflict, they were barely regarded as a security risk, and
were merely required to obey a curfew and report once a week to their local police station. Women,
children and men over military age were allowed to leave Germany after the initial mobilisation was
completed. The retaliatory measures introduced in November and December 1914, and extended
to subjects of the British Empire’s self-governing dominions(Kolonialengländer) in early 1915, saw
the imprisonment of 4,273 British males at a former racecourse at Ruhleben, near Berlin,[53] and a
smaller tally of Frenchmen sent to the main civilian camp at Holzminden.[54] However, both groups
were too small to act as serious bargaining counters in negotiations with the enemy over camp
conditions and prisoner exchanges. At the same time, they had to be fed, guarded and sheltered.
In other words, over time these enemy alien prisoners became an economic and psychological
burden on the German war effort, especially because, unlike rank-and-file military POWs and
civilian deportees from occupied territories, they could not be made to work.
From the beginning of the war, prominent Frenchmen, Belgians and Russians, and local officials
who dared to speak out against German occupation policies, were also seized as hostages or in
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reprisal for supposed misdeeds by the enemy, and sent to Holzminden or other camps at Rastatt
and Havelberg, sometimes with their entire families. Again, this made little difference to Germany’s
overall bargaining position and as a general rule these political prisoners were not required to
contribute labour to the German war economy.[55]
Russian-Polish civilians were a different matter, however. Each year hundreds of thousands of
Russian Poles entered the eastern parts of the German Reich to work as seasonal labourers in
agriculture, and less frequently, in industry.[56] As of 1 August 1914, when Germany declared war
on Russia, they were also technically enemy aliens. However, on 27 July 1914 the Reich Office of
Interior had already taken pre-emptive action to prevent these Poles from being interned or
expelled, requesting instead that they be granted exemption from any restrictions on their
continued employment, provided they were "in possession of one of the identity cards issued by
the labour exchange."[57] Further decrees emanating from the deputy general staff between 4
August and 10 October 1914 forbade roughly 300,000 Russian-Polish seasonal workers from
returning home or leaving their employers.[58] In effect they were now forced labourers, as were at
least an additional 240,000 Russian Poles and 60,000 Balts "recruited" to work in the Reich
following Germany’s occupation of their homelands between 1915 and 1918.[59]
Economic motives were also paramount in deportations of civilians from the occupied parts of
Belgium and northern France in 1916/17 for forced labour in Germany or behind the military lines
on the Western Front. The context was the growing "economic totalisation of the war," including
the forced recruitment of enemy POWs into domestic industry and agriculture,[60] and the
brutalisation of the occupation regimes themselves, especially in the army operational and staging
areas (Operations- und Etappengebieten) which were under the High Command’s direct
authority.[61] Germany was not entirely unique in this matter, since Tsarist Russia forcibly recruited
civilian labour in occupied Galicia in 1914/15; Austria-Hungary in frontier regions and in occupied
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Romania and Italy; Bulgaria in occupied Vardar-Macedonia; and
Turkey among its Armenian, Greek and Syrian Christian populations. However, Germany stood out
in terms of scale and organisation.[62]
Already over Easter 1916 around 20,000 French girls and women were deported from the
industrial cities of Lille, Tourcoing and Roubaix to perform forced agricultural work in other parts of
occupied France. Class and gender differences were no longer respected, as all of the prisoners
were treated like common prostitutes and were required to undergo compulsory gynaecological
examinations.[63] Occupied French civilians, it was suggested, would be "paying with their own
persons" for the sacrifices required of German women on the home front.[64] This was followed, in
October 1916, by the deportation of roughly 60,000 male Belgian workers to Germany for forced
labour. A further 62,000 were obliged to work in so-called "Civil Workers’ Battalions" (Zivil-Arbeiter-
Bataillonen) behind military lines in France and Belgium itself. Both sets of deportees were placed
under military discipline, quartered in special camps, and forced to wear red armbands identifying
them as civilian prisoners.[65]
Eventually the Belgian deportations to Germany were halted in February 1917 in the wake of
strong domestic and international criticism, but the use of forced civilian workers on the Western
Front, and of coercive recruitment methods in Poland, Lithuania, Romania and other occupied
territories in the east, lasted until the end of the war.[66] Hundreds of prominent civilians, political
suspects and alleged spies were also held in Romania after its defeat in December 1916 in an
attempt to secure compliance with the demands of the occupying Central Powers and force the
government in Iaşi to accept peace terms.[67] Beyond this, thousands of enemy civilians continued
to be deported as hostages, bargaining chips or suspected saboteurs to camps and prisons in
Germany, including women, children and men over fifty-five years of age. The German
government’s own figures reveal a rise in the number of civilian detainees from 48,513 in June
1915 to 111,879 in October 1918,[68] while in the last month of the war the ICRC continued to
report fresh cases that had come to its attention:
Every week we are supplied with new lists, some of them relating to very particular
groups: English civilians held in Finland, French, Italian, Belgian and Portuguese
diplomatic personnel expelled from neutral Ukraine and interned in Germany, etc. …
Some civilian detainees in Germany appear to have been transferred to prisons in
Belgium and occupied France, where they can neither communicate with their families
in unoccupied France, nor receive aid parcels, nor have visits from representatives of
the neutral powers charged with their protection. We regret that up till now it has
proved impossible to obtain any kind of information on the conditions those prisoners
are being held in.[69]
In general, German policy towards enemy civilians greatly damaged the Reich’s international
standing yet did little to ease the on-going labour shortages in the domestic war economy and
occupied territories.[70] More importantly still, it failed to offer much by way of protection to German
civilians held in enemy countries. As already seen, Kriege’s public offer to Britain of an "all for all"
exchange in November 1916 was rejected in London. Under the armistice of 11 November 1918,
Germany was obliged to release all of its civilian and military prisoners immediately. By contrast,
the Allies held on to their German internees for much longer. In Britain and France, for instance,
the last civilian prisoners were not released until October-November 1919, almost a year after the
end of the war.[71]
Internment in the United States
Internment practices in the United States were partly influenced by the fact that America had
already come into contact with this new weapon of war through its role as "protecting power"
representing the interests of enemy states in a number of different warring countries.[72] In
particular James Watson Gerard (1867-1951) and Walter Hines Page (1855-1918), the American
ambassadors in Berlin and London, respectively, were in close contact and regularly swapped
notes about the treatment of Germans in Britain and Britons in Germany, as well as sending each
other more formal camp inspection reports. Their exchanges indicate that they were well aware of
the harmful effects of sensational media reports in creating a vicious circle of reprisals and
counter-reprisals. On 8 November 1914, for instance, Gerard warned Page that:
Great popular resentment has been created by the reports of the arrest of Germans [in
Britain]...The order for the general concentration of British males between the ages of
seventeen and fifty-five, which went out on the 6th instant, was occasioned by the
pressure of public opinion which has been still further excited by the newspaper
reports of a considerable number of deaths in the concentration camps...I cannot but
feel that to a great extent the English action and the German retaliation have been
caused by a misunderstanding which we should do our best to remove ...[73]
Although American diplomats were anxious to lessen hatred between London and Berlin, in
practice they were often far more negative in their assessment of Germany’s treatment of enemy
civilians compared to Britain’s. Gerard in particular was known for his "plain-speaking" on this and
other issues.[74] Upon his return to America in March 1917 he penned two publications which
denounced German militarism as a threat to all free peoples, including the United States, and
which played no small part in the mobilisation of domestic public opinion for war. One of his wilder
claims, based on an alleged boast made to him by the German Under-Secretary of State Arthur
Zimmermann (1864-1940), was that 500,000 German reservists were living in America and poised
to engage in open revolt once war was declared.[75]
Gerard’s views had some effect, although he was warned by the State Department to be more
"discreet in [his] utterances."[76] After America entered the war on 6 April 1917, German nationals
were subject to a series of restrictions on their lives, property and freedom of movement imposed
by President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) under the 1798 Alien Enemy Act, including bans on
entering "forbidden zones", compulsory registration with the police or U.S. postmasters, prohibition
on owning signalling apparatus, radios and firearms, and so on. At various points these restrictions
were increased or exemptions revoked, largely to appease public opinion. They were also
extended to Austro-Hungarians in December 1917 and to all female enemy aliens in April 1918.[77]
Violations were dealt with harshly, and police round-ups became common. Surveillance operations
indeed led to over 10,000 arrests, 8,500 of which were conducted under presidential warrants, the
rest carried out by local justice officials who then reported their actions to the Justice Department
in Washington D.C. Most were paroled after a short period of "investigation" into their
circumstances, although the arrest itself was a humiliating experience and could lead to loss of
employment, social standing, housing or all three.[78]
Given that only sixteen of the 1,200 Americans registered as living in Germany in April 1917 were
interned,[79] Washington was not under pressure to retaliate directly in the face of German
measures against its own citizens. In general, the Justice Department used its summary wartime
powers to control and monitor enemy aliens rather than opting for mass internment on the
European model. There were some exceptions, however. About 2,300 "dangerous enemy aliens"
were permanently incarcerated in two camps set up by the War Department: Fort Oglethorpe,
Georgia and Fort Douglas, Utah.[80] The vast majority were German nationals or German
Austrians, suggesting that this particular ethnic group was targeted as disloyal. On the other hand,
the United States differed from France, Britain and Australia in the sense that it targeted
individuals and did not indiscriminately round people up on grounds of nationality or ethnicity
alone.[81] At worst, 8 percent of male, military-age enemy aliens spent some time in custody. An
even lower proportion than this – indeed, probably only about 2 percent – were actually interned
for the duration of the war and beyond.[82]
Around 10 percent of the 2,300 civilian internees held at Fort Oglethorpe and Fort Douglas were
wealthy German-born immigrants suspected of disloyal behaviour, including financing pro-German
propaganda. A much bigger contingent was made up of ordinary workers, however, including the
destitute and unemployed, and many whose only "crime" was to have been involved in radical
politics or labour unrest. As in Australia, non-naturalised Germans and even first and second
generation naturalised German immigrants were widely seen as an "enemy within", especially as
the socialist, pacifist and anti-war movements in the United States contained many activists from
ethnic German backgrounds.[83] However, even in the case of anti-war agitators, the American
authorities were still inclined to investigate each individual case rather than making blanket
referrals for internment.
Alongside the civilian internees, up to 2,800 seamen of various kinds (naval officers and crew
accused of "violating American neutrality", together with merchant mariners captured after 6 April
1917 in American ports and in colonial possessions like the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam and Puerto
Rico), were also interned at Fort McPherson, Georgia, and in Hot Springs, North Carolina.[84]
From April 1918 plans were even laid to intern female enemy aliens suspected of aiding the
enemy, but in the end, although scores of women were arrested, most were quickly released and
only fifteen were held indefinitely.[85]
In addition, the United States carried out internment in colonial contexts, for instance in Panama,
which imprisoned thirty-two Germans after its declaration of war on Germany and then deported
them, under the guidance of U.S. immigration officials, to Ellis Island in April 1918.[86] Enemy
aliens were not allowed to reside in the Canal Zone or the District of Columbia, under a
proclamation issued by President Wilson in November 1917.[87] Here, as in Britain and Australia,
the reinforcement of racial hierarchies in the colonies and the metropole went hand in hand with
the isolation and expulsion of German nationals. The United States was also accused of
pressuring the governments of Cuba and Peru to introduce internment measures there.[88] In all
cases, release and/or repatriation after November 1918 was slow, and it was not until March 1920
that the Swiss delegation in Washington D.C. was able to inform the German government that no
more German citizens were being held.[89] In the meantime, as Jörg Nagler has put it, "Transition
from the enemy alien hysteria to the Red Scare of 1919 and 1920 had its impact on the prolonged
stay of the last inmates of the camps, who were considered to be radicals and too dangerous to be
paroled."[90]
Internment practices, as Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker have argued, offer some important insights
into "what was new" about the First World War. In particular, they shed light on the growing
brutalisation of social relations, the mobilisation of new emotions and hatreds, and the cultural
interplay between warring states and societies, all of which helped to transform the conflict into a
sacred "crusade" in which "people ... believed they were defending the … values of their country,
their region [and] their family’ against a ‘barbaric’ foe.[91] More generally, the deliberate targeting of
enemy civilians as representatives of the ‘enemy nation’ became a crucial part of "total war".
Internees could be both "victims of the home front" and victims of harsh occupation policies. In
Britain and America anti-foreigner violence preceded and accompanied the mass internment of
enemy aliens. In Germany there were no such riots, but internment here went hand in hand with a
"dual system of prisoner labour companies" which extended from the fighting fronts to the camps
on the home front, and from POWs to civilian deportees.[92]
Having said that, scholars are still rightly cautious about drawing any direct link with the far greater
atrocities committed against civilians during the 1939-45 period. At best WWI is seen as having
provided a "background of experience" rather than an "example" or "prototype" for what was to
come.[93] Moreover, while a case can be made for "German singularity", in the sense that this
country more vigorously pursued the link between internment and mobilisation of all resources for
total war, the British and American examples also stand out in various ways. Britain, for instance,
as Panikos Panayi has astutely observed, was the only belligerent in both world wars that was
capable of, and willing to follow, a policy of "global incarceration", affecting Germans and Austrians
(and to a lesser extent, Turks and Bulgarians) in all corners of the world.[94] The United States is
best known for its internment of up to 120,000 Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans after
the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941.[95] The number of enemy aliens incarcerated in
1917-20 was much smaller by comparison, and here internment decisions were made on a case-
by-case basis rather than being the result of blanket labelling of an entire immigrant group. Even
so, questioning the loyalty of individual citizens and non-citizens from particular ethnic
backgrounds became standard practice for American agencies involved in domestic security after
Conclusion
1918 and the association of German- as well as Russian-born émigrés with left-wing subversion
continued through to the late 1940s and beyond.[96]
The three cases we have looked at, then, provide both strong evidence of the global
interconnectedness of WWI internment systems and the importance of seeing those systems
within different national, imperial and local contexts. It is probably in Britain and its empire that
WWI internment had the longest cultural impact, given the near complete destruction of German
communities there. In the United States too German-speaking communities were largely erased by
the war and its aftermath, albeit less through internment and expulsions, and more through
aggressive "assimilationist" measures, for instance the closure or renaming of German churches,
schools, newspapers, shops and firms at the local level; the rebranding of Sauerkraut as "Liberty
Cabbage" and German measles as "Liberty measles"; and the general ousting of the German
language from public life.[97]
In Germany, on the other hand, resident or immigrant English- and French-speaking communities
were simply not large enough to have had an appreciable impact on economic and cultural life
before 1914, either nationally or – with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine – locally. While civilians in
occupied territories might be exploited for their labour or seized as hostages as part of an
increasingly violent total war strategy, the internment of enemy aliens on the home front was
unlikely to reap any meaningful commercial or security benefits. In terms of domestic and foreign
propaganda, the key issue by late 1914 was: could Germany do anything to protect the interests of
its citizens trapped in hostile countries or deported from its overseas colonies during the course of
the war (or more negatively, could it seek revenge or redress for the alleged mistreatment of its
citizens by enemy powers)? Looking back from the vantage point of 1919, there could only be one
answer to this question. In this sense, internment was much more of a failure for Germany than for
its erstwhile opponents.
Matthew Stibbe, Sheffield Hallam University
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